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I. Introduction
Public Interest Lawyering results from a decade-long effort by Alan K. Chen 
and Scott Cummings, two former public interest lawyers. The authors go 
beyond poverty practice and social justice litigation to evaluate public 
interest lawyering as a field of scholarly inquiry. Their book maps a mature 
field of study built on normative and empirical scholarship about the legal 
profession’s relationship to the public interest and social change. This volume 
will be a tremendous resource for those who teach and write in this area for 
years to come. There is so much to admire it is difficult to know where to begin. 
Addressing all of the book’s virtues would be an impossible task. Instead, I 
focus on three things the authors do especially well: defining public interest 
law, evaluating the pro bono contributions of the private bar, and canvassing 
the rich empirical research in the field. These particular virtues distinguish the 
book from its predecessors and contribute to its worth as a research tool and 
teaching resource. I close with thoughts evoked by the book about modes of 
public interest lawyering into the future.
II. Three Virtues of This Volume
A. Care in Defining Public Interest law
The book opens by taking on the most difficult question in the field: 
defining public interest lawyering (5–32), a task that as often as not provokes 
heated debate about the practical and normative boundaries of the field.1 
1. See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold & Austin Sarat, Something to Believe In: Politics, 
Professionalism, and Cause Lawyering 5–6 (Stanford Law & Politics 2004); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the Motivation and 
Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and 
Professional Responsibilities, at 31, 33–37 (A. Sarat and S. Scheingold eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998); Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning 
of “Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1223, 1236–37 (2005); see generally Thomas M. 
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Are public interest lawyers only those who serve the poor? Does the label 
extend to counsel for underrepresented constituencies? Who counts as 
underrepresented? Racial minorities? Consumers? Tea Party members? Are 
these constituencies underrepresented because of systemic disadvantage or 
the failure of the democratic political process? Are they merely the current 
losers in political or ideological battles? Are lawyers who represent important 
causes, rather than clients, also engaged in public interest lawyering? 
Consider, for example, former ACLU director Melvin Wulf’s statement that 
his organization’s real client is the Bill of Rights (288). Who defines the 
public interest? Is it hopelessly indeterminate? Does the public interest mean 
anything other than the particular goals of an advocacy organization or activist 
lawyer? You can see the problem.
Rather than taking the common route by acknowledging the diversity 
of views and then choosing one “for the purposes of this book,” the 
authors exhaustively review the literature about public interest lawyering’s 
characteristics and defining features. They suggest that one way through the 
thicket is to view public interest lawyering as a response to systemic failures in the 
market, the political system and civil society (6–7). Market failures leave some 
people without representation because they are too poor to afford a lawyer or 
because their interests are too diffuse to overcome barriers to collective action 
so they may pool resources to obtain representation. Consumers, for example, 
may have widespread, diffuse, and relatively small individual claims that are 
too expensive to justify individual litigation, yet their aggregate injuries may 
be significant. Political failures, by contrast, occur when groups of citizens 
are excluded from equal participation in the political process (215) and legal 
action is needed to advance these groups’ collective interests.2 Civil society 
failures flow from citizen disengagement or lack of participation in governance. 
Although widely cited critiques by Theda Skocpol and Robert Putnam raise 
concerns about Americans’ lack of civic engagement, scholars struggle to 
identify institutional solutions.3 Some suggest that advocacy organizations, 
including public interest law organizations, are a rational and effective form of 
civic participation in a large, diverse society like the U.S (463–64).4
Hilbink, You Know the Type…: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 657 
(2004); Legal Studies Division, Washington Legal Foundation, In Whose Interest? Public 
Interest Law Activism in the Law Schools (1990).
2. A classic example is the NAACP’s successful challenge to the Texas Democratic Party’s 
white-only primary rules in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Drawing on conceptions 
of democracy in political theory, Eric Olin Wright suggests that “[i]n a politically just 
society, all people would have broadly equal access to the necessary means to participate 
meaningfully in decisions about things which affect their lives.” Envisioning Real Utopias 
12 (Verso 2010). 
3. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (Simon & Schuster 2000); Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From 
Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Univ. Okla. Press 2003).
4. Debra C. Minkoff, Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and Civil Society, 
40 American Behavioral Scientist 606 (1997).
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The authors do an admirable job grappling with the democratic tensions 
inherent in defining and justifying public interest lawyering. The debate 
over democratic legitimacy in particular raises complicated issues for lawyers 
interested in bringing about social change (223–24). On the one hand, scholars 
such as Francis Zemans argue that public interest litigation is a direct form 
of political participation, accessible to the ordinary citizen, and therefore, 
consistent with democracy.5 On the other hand, some (mostly conservative) 
critics argue that policymaking through the courts circumvents representative 
democracy and allows litigants to make important choices about governance 
without electoral accountability.6 The distinction between lawyering for 
social change and interest-group politics never has been easy to draw, but the 
authors do an excellent job detailing and discussing characteristics that might 
demarcate public interest lawyering. These characteristics include the need 
to represent otherwise excluded viewpoints; the ability to and desirability of 
challenging government overreach; the relative power disadvantage between 
parties; the altruistic motivation of the attorneys or their moral commitment 
to a cause; the physical location in which the lawyer practices, including an 
organization’s nonprofit status; and the overarching goal of social change (8–
32). Not all of these criteria, the authors note, necessarily speak to the failures 
of market, politics, or civil society. 
Focusing on these systemic failures works well analytically to sharpen 
the debate over what we might mean by public interest lawyering. It also, 
however, could be viewed as an implicit argument that properly operating 
market and political institutions are the appropriate venues for social struggle; 
only when these avenues break down may public interest lawyers legitimately 
step into the breach. Anarchists, revolutionaries, opponents of capitalism 
and even some critical legal scholars may find this approach unsatisfying 
because it leaves unchallenged the very market, political, and dare I say legal 
institutions that they view as the source of injustice and inequality.7 Indeed, 
social movement scholars long have discounted public interest lawyering as 
elite contention within the existing system, rather than the more radical social 
activism of storming the barricades or suffering arrest and imprisonment for 
breaking unjust laws.8 I find this argument too dismissive; it certainly doesn’t 
5. Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political 
System, 77 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 690 (1983).
6. Kenneth F. Boehm. & Peter T. Flaherty, Why the Legal Services Corporation Must be 
Abolished, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1; Institute for 
Educational Affairs, The Heritage Foundation, Perspectives on Public Interest Law: 
Issue 2 of Occasional Papers / Foundation Officers Forum (1981); Jefferson Decker, The 
Conservative Legal Movement and American Government, 1971–1987 (2009) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the author). 
7. See Dragan Milovanovic, Review Essay: Critical Legal Studies and the Assault on the 
Bastion, Social Justice, Spring 1988, at 162 (reviewing Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1983)).
8. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–
1970, xxix, 184–85 (2d ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1999); see Martin Luther King, 
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feel elite or mainstream to be the public interest lawyer in private negotiations, 
Congress, or court. Nevertheless, there is an important normative tension here 
between hewing to professional values and working toward transformative 
social change.
The authors are well aware of this tension. In later chapters of the book, 
they explore the tensions and contradictions of combining activism with 
professional obligations and roles (293–97, 306–07, 356–67, 370–72). They 
draw on an excerpt from Nancy Polikoff’s article, “Am I My Client? The 
Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist,” to explore whether a lawyer can and 
should combine the professional role of dispassionate counselor with the 
lawyer’s own active participation in the movement (293–97). The authors 
also explore more generally the role of lawyers in broader social movements 
(461–63). At the end of this rich discussion, the authors wisely resist providing 
a tidy model for public interest lawyering that reconciles radical advocacy 
with legal representation. Throughout the volume, however, readers will find 
fodder for discussion about how, and whether, radicalism and public interest 
representation can be combined. I see this as a very desirable characteristic of 
a text on public interest lawyering.
B. Attention to Public Interest Lawyering by the Private Bar
A second virtue of this book is how it recognizes that public interest 
lawyering occurs in the private bar, as well as in nonprofit public interest 
law organizations. The literature long neglected the contributions of private 
pro bono and hybrid public interest-private practice firms to public interest 
lawyering. That has begun to change.9 In my opinion, we do a disservice to our 
students by portraying public interest lawyering as separate and different from 
traditional private practice. This portrayal risks relieving private practitioners 
from any sense of personal responsibility for the public interest (34), and too 
often relegates public interest lawyering to the less prestigious margins of the 
profession.10
This volume directly challenges the perception that public interest lawyering 
primarily occurs in nonprofits. It documents the substantial contribution that 
private lawyers make to pro bono representation and to access to justice. As 
the authors note, this is a relatively new trend in the profession. Many large 
Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Fellow Clergymen, April 16, 1963, Letter from 
Birmingham Jail, available at http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/resources/article/
annotated_letter_from_birmingham.
9. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2004); Deborah 
Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice: Public Service and the Professions (Stanford 
Univ. Press 2005); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style 
Civil Legal Assistance, 41 Law & Soc’y Rev. 79 (2007); Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather, 
Private Lawyers & the Public Interest: The Evolving Role of Pro Bono in the Legal 
Profession (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
10. See John P. Heinz & Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar 
171 (rev. ed., Northwestern Univ. Press 1994).
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firms and even some private companies institutionalized pro bono programs 
for their lawyers in response to decreasing governmental support for legal 
services work; legislative restrictions on federal funded legal aid offices; 
increased demand from nonprofit organizations for co-counsel relationships 
with private lawyers; and the desire by junior associates for meaningful public 
interest opportunities (170–73). Large firms now contribute extensively; Steven 
Boutcher reports that law firms in the AmLaw 200 contributed more than 3.75 
million pro bono hours in 2005 alone.11 
Although the authors view these trends as positive for access to justice, they 
do not romanticize pro bono representation by private lawyers. They take 
an unflinching look at the challenges and conflicts that arise in this context, 
including: declining large firm commitment to private pro bono during 
economic downturns; accepting only those pro bono clients who avoid public 
controversy and minimize positional conflicts with for-profit clients; selecting 
cases based on lawyers’ interests rather than community needs; and the lack of 
expertise among private lawyers in poverty or cause issues (173–81). Thus, the 
book provides rich comparative material for considering how public interest 
lawyering faces different challenges and constraints in private and nonprofit 
settings. The discussion makes an important contribution to this literature and 
to the field.
The material on private pro bono reflects the high quality scholarship of 
Scott Cummings, a leading scholar on how the private bar contributes to 
public interest lawyering.12 The book provides a vital discussion of the many 
venues through which the legal profession increases access to justice and serves 
the public interest. By broadening the perspective on pro bono, the authors 
renew the idea that public service is a professional obligation of all lawyers, 
not a task delegated to a few (54–56).13 Indeed, if the profession wishes to 
preserve its legitimacy and autonomy, it must consider access to justice and 
ethical lawyering beyond the interests of individual clients.
C. Review of the Rich Empirical Research in the Field
A third truly impressive aspect of this volume is the authors’ extensive 
review of empirical research in the field to illustrate their points and to raise 
important questions about public interest lawyering. Empirical research about 
11. Steven A. Boutcher, The Institutionalization of Pro Bono in Large Law Firms: Trends and 
Variation Across the AmLaw 200, in Granfield & Mather, supra note 9, at 135, 144.
12. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 9; Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro 
Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2357 (2010); Scott L. Cummings, 
Access to Justice in the New Millennium: Achieving the Promise of Pro Bono, Human 
Rights, Summer 2005, at 6–10. 
13. Louis Brandeis took this approach, arguing that private lawyers representing corporate 
clients should serve as “lawyer for the situation,” providing guidance to their clients to make 
decisions consistent with the public interest and to be sensitive to the societal implications 
of their conduct. See the Chen and Cummings discussion of Brandeis’ view of the moral 
obligation of lawyers to use their powers to protect the public interest (54–56). 
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public interest lawyering has grown dramatically in recent years, along with 
the trend toward empirical legal studies more generally. Some of this research 
examines key questions or assumptions relevant to the profession. To what 
extent do cause lawyers defer to the preferences and goals of their clients, 
as professional ethics require? How do cause lawyers resolve ethical issues 
when the interests of the client and the cause diverge? How do the narratives 
of clients and lawyers about public-interest claims differ and why? These are 
classic issues in public interest law practice, and the authors do a terrific job 
of bringing to bear empirical research to think them through (especially in 
Chapters 6 and 7).
Those teaching from this volume may wish to press their students as to 
whether these questions are unique to public interest lawyers. Isn’t it possible 
these same questions occur for lawyers representing private clients, too? 
Defense firms, for example, may have a financial interest in prolonging 
litigation, a stake that may conflict with their client’s desire to minimize 
litigation costs and resolve a case quickly. Private clients of traditional 
lawyers may feel that the legal narratives of their cases do not resemble their 
understanding of the problems they bring their lawyers, just as public interest 
clients do. Indeed, the broader research about the legal profession shows 
agency problems and role conflict in for-profit as well as nonprofit settings.14 
In this way, the book by Chen and Cummings presents an opportunity 
to explore how many of these issues may be characteristic to lawyering, in 
general, and not limited to nonprofit public-interest practice. This may seem 
strange—to draw on a book about public interest lawyering to challenge the 
received wisdom that its practitioners differ in important ways from ordinary 
lawyers. But one way to undercut the claim that public interest lawyering is 
contrary to professional norms is to ask if private lawyers actually conform to 
these purported norms. Perhaps private lawyers look more like their public 
interest counterparts than first appears. That’s a ripe topic for future empirical 
research and this book provides a solid foundation for such study.
Even more interesting, at least to me, was the authors’ review of empirical 
research showing how public interest lawyering has expanded and changed. 
The authors make a significant contribution with their discussion of research 
about the rise of public interest law firms on the political right (100–15). To their 
credit, they resist the temptation to exclude conservative cause lawyers from 
the definition of public interest lawyering; instead, they give this development 
careful and appropriate attention. They show that conservative public interest 
lawyers exhibit a diversity of causes and intra-movement divisions similar to 
their progressive counterparts (112–15). They note how the growing ideological 
diversity of public interest law organizations raises important issues about the 
interaction between politics and cause lawyering (95–96, 116–21). 
14. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 457 
(2000).
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In short, the book is a treasure trove of empirical work on public interest 
lawyering. The literature it reviews spans a range of topics, from the macro of 
public interest law firm organization to the micro of lawyer-client relations. 
This feature truly sets it apart from other volumes about this field. 
III. The Changing Reality of Public Interest Lawyering
It seems fitting to conclude by raising important questions about the 
models and philosophies of public interest lawyering so meticulously explored 
in this book. There are many ways to slice the field based on lawyers’ activities 
including, direct services and impact litigation; litigation, community 
economic development or community organizing; and legislative and policy 
advocacy and test litigation. There also are many contested models for public 
interest lawyers’ relationships with their clients, including, to name a few, 
conventional client-lawyer relations; client-centered lawyering; or grassroots 
community lawyering oriented toward empowerment. Those teaching from 
this book will appreciate the authors’ careful attention to how each of these 
forms speaks to core values of client autonomy, lawyer accountability and 
legitimacy and access to justice (275–79, 281–90, 292–302, 318–27). Important 
trade-offs occur among these models of representation; the materials in this 
volume lay the foundation for a rich discussion of those choices.
That said, the understandable need to draw out the distinctive features of 
these models for teaching purposes tends to emphasize the differences among 
them rather than to evaluate how these differences were socially constructed. 
Many divides in the field reflect a history of conflict and struggle. They tell of 
political opposition to public interest representation and the Legal Services 
Corporation, hostility toward cause lawyers taking advantage of “activist 
judges” to make policy, and frustration on the part of powerful and dominant 
interests with advocates’ success in the courts.15 These struggles shaped the 
field through outside forces rather than internal reflection and the models or 
modes of lawyering reflect these pressures.
Those teaching with this volume may wish to ask students whether the 
models and modes of public interest lawyering advanced by scholars are 
enduring categories or the product of how the field developed. To take just one 
example, legal services lawyers’ apparent emphasis on direct services rather 
than open pursuit of social-change litigation is as much a matter of politics 
and self-preservation as it is a philosophical position on the practice of public 
interest law. Indeed, in the early days of the Legal Services Corporation, lawyers 
adopted an explicit law reform strategy that included complex litigation on 
novel legal theories, class actions and extensive appellate litigation, including 
70 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court between 1967 and 1973.16 Their 
15. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest 
Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why it Matters for Social Change, Law & 
Soc. Inquiry (forthcoming 2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
lsi.12013/pdf.
16. Id. at 4.
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remarkable success, however, created a backlash from business interests and 
powerful political actors who sought to limit their ability to pursue social 
change.17 In the 1980s, legal service organizations came under attack. Congress 
dramatically cut funding and imposed severe restrictions on the activities of 
legal services lawyers, which changed their practice dramatically.18 
This history gives context to these categories, which embody the struggles 
that accompanied the development of the field. The divide between direct 
services and impact litigation, from this perspective, is less a natural cleavage 
than the product of political backlash in which powerful actors used the 
state to restrict the scope of social change litigation on behalf of poor clients. 
This history shows how political forces shaped the models of public interest 
lawyering that we see today.
Wise teachers also might ask students to discuss how modern dynamics are 
breaking down the barriers among these models of public interest lawyering, 
and, perhaps, creating new ones. Indeed, the book concludes with a call for 
more integration among the various strategies employed by public interest 
lawyers (515–24). What would an integrative vision of public interest lawyering 
look like? As professors, how might we teach such a thing? Throughout the 
book, the authors provide numerous examples indicating that practice is 
moving in this direction. They note how pro bono representation has become 
integrated into private practice through big firm programs and small firm 
low bono representation (170–200). They also note how lawyers increasingly 
integrate litigation strategies with community organizing, legislative advocacy 
and other tactics. Lawyers also are developing new strategies, such as 
community economic development (233–44). Modern public interest lawyers 
need to think outside the box to continue to serve their clients, communities 
and causes. This volume is a tremendous resource for making that happen.
17. Id. at 4, 5–6.
18. Id. at 5–6.
